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In 2018, a distinct downward trend began to emerge in public support for the Russian author-
ities – the president, government, and other political institutions. All opinion poll companies 
have recorded this decline, which applies not only to the authorities’ approval ratings, but 
also to their policies, including foreign policy, which has traditionally been an area in which 
the Kremlin has garnered popularity. The greatest losses have been seen in the ratings for 
Vladimir Putin, whose ratings have returned to the level recorded prior to the annexation of 
Crimea. For the first time since he has been in power, Putin has fallen behind the army, and in 
some cases the orthodox church as well, in the institutional opinion polls.
The falling support for the president and his policies is confirmation that “geopolitical suc-
cesses” such as the annexation of Crimea are no longer a factor ensuring that the public 
stands behind the Kremlin. As the impression made by the geopolitical successes wears off, 
Russians are becoming more and more focused on domestic problems, above all the poverty 
resulting from a long-term decrease in real income. The event that triggered discontent and 
led to street protests was decisions made by the authorities that have been seen as unjust 
(such as raising the age of retirement).
Even though, seen objectively, the president’s ratings remain high, at approximately 60%, 
this downward trend, being a decrease of between ten and twenty percentage points, 
is a sign, under the Russian system, that the Kremlin’s legitimacy is fading. This system is 
largely based on a high level of support for Putin, while the other political institutions take 
a back seat. This change in the public mood is forcing the Kremlin to seek a new strategy, and 
at least partly concede to public demands. However, with little chance of the public’s expec-
tations being met, it is unlikely that the decline in support for the authorities can be halted. 
Thus, the increasing deficiency in the Kremlin’s legitimacy means that the Kremlin is facing 
a difficult decision as to the policy to be followed from now on.
Losses for everyone,  
the greatest losses for the president
The fall in approval ratings for the government, 
led by the president, has been noted by all of 
the opinion poll companies – whether it is an 
independent Levada Centre, the governmental 
research centre WCIOM, or FOM, which is close 
to the authorities. Opinion polls in Russia are 
not always considered reliable, with many Rus-
sians treating pollsters as representatives of the 
state and giving pro-government responses due 
to fear of recriminations. This climate means at 
best that the true support for the authorities is 
even lower, while any difference is hard to esti-
mate. Meanwhile, the consistency in the results 
obtained by various polling companies makes 
the observed downward trend more credible.
Cracks in the marble 
Russians’ trust in Putin on the decline
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Over the last ten years, support for Vladimir 
Putin, defined in the polls as “performance ap-
proval”, has fluctuated quite significantly. It was 
on the decrease during the presidency of Dmi-
tri Medvedev. The ratings for then Prime Min-
ister Putin (who became president again and 
has ruled since 2012) gradually decreased from 
86% in April 2008 to 61% in November 2013, 
the lowest level ever recorded by the Levada 
Centre. The turning point was the annexation 
of Crimea, which bumped up the president’s 
ratings by more than 25 percentage points to 
86% in June 2014, and to a high of 89% in June 
2015, Putin’s highest rating since taking up 
power. There has been a downward trend since 
that time, which sped up considerably in 2018 
following an announcement and implementa-
tion of pension system reform, which is unpop-
ular with the public. Putin’s popularity returned 
to the pre-Crimea level in the summer of 2018, 
and in subsequent months decreased even fur-
ther. In January 2019 it was 64%1.
The level of trust in government representatives 
is also falling. “Trust” is a separate category in 
opinion polls, an important one due to being 
distinct from “approval” (largely defined by the 
political limitations, and a feeling that there is 
no alternative). “Trust” illustrates more person-
al opinions of those in power, and is linked to 
the legitimacy of the regime. For this reason, 
the level of trust in those in power is consid-
erably lower than that of approval. According 
to the Levada Centre, trust in Putin fell by as 
much as 20 percentage points in 2018, from 
59% in November 2017 to 39% in September 
1 See https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/
20182. WCIOM reports that trust in Putin in 
March 2019 had fallen to 32%, the lowest lev-
el since 20063. Characteristically, Putin’s rating 
also fell in polls concerning institutions: the lev-
el of trust in the institution of president is at 
58% (in 2017 – 75%) and has fallen for the first 
time to second place, behind the army (66%)4. 
In a WCIOM opinion poll of January 2019, the 
institution of president even fell to third place 
(62.1%), behind the army (84.7%) and the or-
thodox church (69.1%)5. There has also been 
a turnaround with respect to attribution of 
blame for the country’s problems. While in the 
past the government has mainly been blamed 
for the problems and increasing cost of living, 
most respondents currently blame the presi-
dent. In the view of 55% of respondents, the 
president is principally to blame for problems 
(40% held this view in 2016), 37% say that the 
government is responsible (50% in 2016), and 
21% – Prime Minister Medvedev (32% in 2016). 
Paradoxically, in the same poll, Putin was named 
as having made the greatest contribution to 
Russia’s economic successes and the improved 
standard of living (55%; the government – 13%; 
the prime minister – 4%)6.
Despite the fact that all of these institutions 
have recorded a drop in support in recent 
years, the president has incurred the greatest 
losses. The Levada Centre reports that the fall 
in support for the president (approval rating) 
was almost 14 percentage points (from 76% in 
2 Most recent Levada survey on trust in leading politicians 
of October 2018, https://www.levada.ru/2018/10/08/do-
verie-politikam-2/ 
3 In the past the lowest level of trust in Putin (37.4%) 
was recorded in December 2011during mass protests, 
https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=9518 
4 ‘Доверие пятой части россиян потерял Владимир 
Путин за прошедший год’, https://www.levada.
ru/2018/10/08/doverie-pyatoj-chasti-rossiyan-potery-
al-vladimir-putin-za-proshedshij-god/
5 See WCIOM survey https://wciom.ru/news/ratings/odobr 
enie_deyatelnosti_gosudarstvennyx_institutov/ i https://
wciom.ru/news/ratings/odobrenie_deyatelnosti_obsh-
hestvennyx_institutov/ (Excel tables can be downloaded 
showing changes in mood since 2006).
6 https://www.rbc.ru/politics/13/12/2018/5c0fb4509a 
79479d7f9c0a8b 
Putin’s popularity returned to the pre-
Crimea level in the summer of 2018, and 
in subsequent months decreased even 
further. 
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February 2018 to 62% in January 2019), and the 
decrease in the level of trust – 20 percentage 
points (from 59% in November 2017 to 39% in 
September 2018). For the sake of comparison, 
support for other institutions has fallen over 
the last year by 10 percentage points for Prime 
Minister Dmitri Medvedev, 5 percentage points 
for the government, 3 percentage points for re-
gional authorities, and 8 percentage points for 
the Duma7.
An institution that has emerged unscathed 
from the deepening crisis in trust on the part 
of the public is the army. According to WCIOM 
surveys, the army has significantly improved its 
rating over the last six years, from 52% in 2012 
to 65% in 2014, and 87% in 20188. According 
to a Levada Centre survey, the level of trust 
in the army rose from 39% in 2012 to 66% in 
20189. As mentioned, the army currently leads 
in surveys on public trust carried out by various 
polling companies, which is a novelty over the 
course of Putin’s rule10.
The fall in the ratings of the President and other 
institutions is accompanied by a negative trend 
in opinions held about the authorities’ broad-
er policies – domestic policy, but also foreign 
policy, which for many years met with approv-
al, and boosted the president’s ratings. Ratings 
for the Russian authorities’ domestic policy de-
creased more than twofold in relation to the 
peak in the first quarter of 2015. At that time, 
7 https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/; https://www.levada.
ru/2018/10/04/institutsionalnoe-doverie-4/ 
8 https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=9492 
9 https: //www.levada.ru/2018/10/04/ institutsional-
noe-doverie-4/ 
10 ‘Когда армия выше президента’, https://www.levada.
ru/2018/10/17/kogda-armiya-vyshe-prezidenta/
56% of respondents approved of domestic pol-
icy while the figure today is 23% (a fall of 6 per-
centage points since June 2018, when the pen-
sion system reform was announced)11. There is 
also a decline in public optimism regarding the 
state of the country. Over the last year, this has 
decreased by 9 percentage points (from 54 to 
45%)12. There is also less support for foreign 
policy – an increasing number of Russians take 
the view that the authorities focus too much 
on foreign policy (up from 17% in 2015 to 32% 
in 2019), while a decreasing number say that 
they strike the appropriate balance in terms of 
attention to foreign policy (down from 55 to 
38%)13. There is also a growing belief that Rus-
sia has had more failures than successes in for-
eign policy (from 15% in 2017 to 25% in 2019), 
and less Russians say that it is largely successful 
(from 64 to 45%). The fact that “providing aid 
for Syria” is heralded as the greatest foreign 
policy success in recent years (15%) is further 
proof that annexation of Crimea has exhausted 
its potential as a mobilising factor (6% of re-
spondents consider this a success). At the same 
time, respondents are unhappy at the amount 
of funds designated to provide support for oth-
er countries (in the form of supply of cheap raw 
materials, humanitarian aid, and writing off of 
debt) and designated to military operations in-
stead of social welfare issues at home.
Return to the domestic agenda
The rapidly changing public mood illustrates 
that the “Crimea factor” has run its course 
as a tool for mobilising the public behind the 
Kremlin and raising the president’s ratings. The 
effect of this factor, which outweighed the 
need for a sensible economic approach, could 
be seen in the mood in the first year following 
annexation. Even though Russians suffered due 
11 https://wciom.ru/news/ratings/ocenka_vlastej/ 
12 https://www.levada.ru/2019/02/20/odobrenie-institu-
tov-vlasti-10/ 
13 https://fom.ru/Politika/14174 
There is a downward trend in ratings not 
only of domestic policy, but also foreign 
policy, which for many years boosted the 
president’s ratings.
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to a drop in the Ruble and sanctions (sanctions 
imposed by the West and Russia’s countersanc-
tions, depriving Russians of cheaper and good 
quality food imports), the opinion regarding 
the government’s economic policy improved at 
that time by 10 percentage points, from 26% in 
the first quarter of 2014 to 37% in the second 
quarter of 2015)14.
However, as the euphoria felt due to Russia’s 
geopolitical successes faded, domestic issues 
once again became the most important, above 
all the increasing poverty. In Russia, real in-
comes have fallen for the fifth year in a row; 
between December 2014 and December 2018, 
accounting for inflation, incomes have fallen 
by approximately 12%, while the main factor 
causing inflation is the raising by the state of 
communal and transportation charges15. This 
decrease in incomes is not countered by the of-
ficial salary increases, especially as just under 
half of people’s income is taxed (approximately 
45%) and the rest is unofficial income. There is 
almost no rise in pensions (apart from a one-off 
payment made in 2018 to pensioners who are 
not in work), and income from business activity 
and lease of property is falling16.
The increasing poverty among Russians is con-
firmed by official Rosstat data: towards the end 
of 2017 (the latest data available) 13.2% of the 
population (19.3 m people) were living below 
the poverty line, which is an increase of 3.2 m 
since 201417. Moreover, many experts consid-
14 https://wciom.ru/news/ratings/ocenka_vlastej/ 
15 А. Трушин, К. Журенков, ‘Ловушка бедности’, «Огонек», 
25.02.2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3874090 
16 Ibidem. 
17 http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/
rosstat/ru/statistics/population/poverty/# 
er Rosstat’s calculations to be understated18. 
According to a report produced by the Russian 
Presidential Academy of National Economy and 
Public Administration, 22% of the population 
are believed to be living below the poverty 
line19. Polls also reveal a more serious picture of 
the standard of living – according to a Levada 
Centre survey, the percentage of the public 
whose funds only cover the cost of food, or do 
not even cover the cost of food, has increased 
over the last four years from 16 to 24%20. The 
amount of consumer credit among the popu-
lation is rising – in 2018 this increased by 12%. 
The number of people who have high levels of 
credit is estimated to be 27%; the number of 
people who had three credit arrangements in-
creased in 2018 by 12%, and of those with four 
credit arrangements – by 14%, and five – by 
19%; debts are also on the increase21.
Outraged by injustice
For many years, social and economic problems 
alone were not sufficient reason for Russians to 
actively express their discontent. Even during 
the period in which the standard of living was 
falling in 2016–2017, the mood among Russians 
was quite optimistic, due to adaptation to the 
difficult economic situation and hope that it 
would improve22. The level of discontent grew 
only when the fall in the standard of living was 
compounded with other factors – geopolitical 
campaigns no longer having any propaganda 
value, and government decisions that were seen 
as unjust. The optimism among the people was 
shaken by pension reform pushed through by 
18 Р. Фаляхов, ‘Бедность в России: десятки миллионов 
за чертой’, Газета.ru, 9.05.2018, https://www.gazeta.
ru/business/2018/05/09/11745109.shtml 
19 ‘РАНХиГС: Почти все россияне вынуждены экономить, 
а 22% живут в бедности’, «Бизнес Online», 21.11.2018, 
https://www.business-gazeta.ru/news/403263 
20 https://www.levada.ru/2019/02/11/kak-vlasti-podder-
zhat-rejtingi/ 
21 С. Самусева, К. Дементьева, ‘Число закредитованных 
граждан растет’, «Коммерсант», 20.02.2019, www.
kommersant.ru/doc/3889528 
22 Ibidem. 
In Russia, real incomes have fallen for the 
fifth year in a row; since 2014 they have 
fallen by approximately 12%.
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the government and president in 2018 despite 
stiff opposition on the part of the public (more 
than 90% of Russians were against the reform). 
This reform meant that the time spent in work 
was extended by five years, postponing the 
prospect of retirement for some, and depriv-
ing others of the possibility of combining their 
pension with additional earnings. Russians per-
ceived the reform not only as depriving them of 
a portion of their income (or much-desired rest) 
but also as a manifestation of social injustice, 
and a solution employed by the government to 
the country’s economic problems solely at the 
public’s expense.
The reform triggered public anger and led to 
protests, and also exacerbated sensitivity to 
other symptoms of injustice, to the unequal 
spread of wealth, and to the privileged position 
and arrogance of the elite. The president, who 
assumed responsibility for the pension reform, 
suffered significant falls in his ratings, and has 
been increasingly accused of “forgetting about 
the common people”, and “not knowing how 
common people live”23. Cases of arrogant con-
duct on the part of government officials be-
gan to evoke significant reactions. Polls reveal 
a growing lack of trust on the part of Russians 
in the state and government officials, which is 
twice as high as towards fellow citizens, the im-
mediate community, and family. More than half 
of respondents in Levada Centre polls (52%) say 
that the Russian authorities lie about the state 
of the country (up from 37% in 2017), while 
12% say that they tell the truth (down from 
20%) – 25% believe that they are lied to by their 
fellow citizens24.
23 Ibidem.
24 https://www.levada.ru/2019/02/11/pravda-i-lozh/ 
Opinion polls and research show that Russians 
are developing a greater need for justice, not 
only with regard to social welfare issues, but 
also with regard to equality of all citizens before 
the law. There is increasing demand for respect 
for the public and for standards of integrity in 
domestic politics. There is increasing disillusion-
ment with the idea of a strong leader capable 
of solving any problem25. There is also a slowly 
increasing sense among Russians that they can 
act for themselves and have an influence over 
not only their own situation, but also the state 
of the country. 18% of respondents feel respon-
sible for what happens in their country (com-
pared to 9% in 2017), and 10% say that they 
have an influence over that situation (compared 
to 5% in 2017)26. At the same time, Russians are 
becoming more willing to play an active role 
in politics – currently, 25% of respondents are 
willing to do this (16% in 2017), which is a re-
cord level for the last 12 years27.
Yellow card for the Kremlin?
In addition to the falling ratings of the gov-
ernment, public discontent has also been seen 
over the last year in the form of an increasing 
number of street protests, mainly concerning 
social welfare and economic issues. In 2018, 
there were protests against the pension system 
reform in most regions of Russia, and in many 
regions protests regarding the environmen-
tal problems caused by landfills. Increases in 
fuel prices, increasing communal charges, and 
a high “environment” fee introduced in January 
2019 for waste segregation and treatment, are 
causing discontent. The percentage of Russians 
willing to take part in protests has grown – 
from 19% in 2017 to 37% in 201828. Following 
25 http://www.rosbalt.ru/russia/2018/12/24/1755065.html 
26 https://www.levada.ru/2018/10/31/otvetstvennost 
-rossiyan-za-proishodyashhee-v-strane-vyrosla/ 
27 https://www.levada.ru/2019/01/24/dolya-zhelayush-
hih-uchastvovat-v-politike-rossiyan-dostigla-maksimu-
ma-za-12-let/ 
28 https://www.levada.ru/2018/12/13/protestnyj-potentsi-
al-i-otvetstvennost/ 
Pushing through the pension reform caused 
the president’s ratings to fall more quickly 
and led to increased accusations that he 
has “forgotten about the common people”.
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a period of social calm following the annexa-
tion of Crimea, protests have again, since 2017, 
become a permanent feature of the situation 
in Russia. Protests are regularly held in many 
regions of Russia, including in medium-sized 
and small towns. They are limited in number, 
however: the largest numbers of participants 
in protests against the pension system reform 
were seen in Moscow, of approximately 10,000. 
Individual actions attracted a large percentage 
of town residents, for example in the case of 
protests against landfills that have a toxic ef-
fect on small towns around Moscow – as many 
as one third of the total number of residents29. 
Public discontent can also be seen in the results 
of local elections in September 2018 (shortly af-
ter the pension system reform was announced): 
in some regions, the Kremlin’s candidates lost 
to random rivals30.
The authorities have not left these negative so-
cial trends unanswered. The first major sign of 
concern was President Putin’s annual address 
on 20 February 2019, mainly focusing on social 
welfare issues and promises that people’s lives 
would improve. This contrasts with speeches 
made in recent years, with a mainly anti-West, 
superpower, and military tone. This year’s ad-
dress contained extensive promises concerning 
social welfare questions, intended for families 
and people with the lowest incomes, proposals 
29 For more information see J. Rogoża, ‘A stinking busi-
ness. Environmental issues, protests and big money 
in the waste business in Russia’, OSW Commentary, 
28.08.2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2018-08-27/a-stinking-business-envi-
ronmental-issues-protests-and-big 
30 See M. Domańska, ‘Defeat for the Kremlin in regional 
elections’, OSW Analyses, 26.09.2018, https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2018-09-26/de-
feat-kremlin-regional-elections
to improve the condition of the health service, 
education, and the environment, and the pos-
sibility of deferment of repayment of consumer 
credit. At the same time, Putin warned govern-
ment officials at various levels, as he has done 
repeatedly, making them responsible for imple-
menting those commitments31. Another social 
“gesture” towards the public are ‘national pro-
jects’, in areas such as demographics, the health 
service, education, housing, the environment, 
etc. These were announced by Vladimir Putin 
in May 2018 following his election as president, 
and the government is now determining how 
these projects will be financed in the budget. 
The public is sceptical about the president’s 
promises. It supports them but is not convinced 
that they will be enacted. This is a result of dis-
trust towards the state that has accumulated 
over many years32. Polls conducted following 
the speech did not show a major improve-
ment in the president’s ratings. According to 
the FOM they remained unchanged, moreover, 
38% started to trust the president less over the 
period of the last month, and only 15% more33. 
In WCIOM polls, meanwhile, a slight increase 
in the president’s approval ratings in the last 
week (from 62.6 to 64.8%) was accompanied 
by an equally small decrease in trust (from 33.5 
to 32.8%34).
The drop in support and increasing number 
of protests presents a major challenge for the 
authorities. Even though the regime in Russia 
is authoritarian and employs repressive meas-
ures towards the people, to date the repression 
has been selective and limited. For many years, 
the authorities focused more on recognising 
and steering the public mood, and the eco-
31 For more information see I. Wiśniewska, J. Rogoża, 
W. Rodkiewicz, M. Domańska, ‘Putin’s welfare address’, 
OSW Analyses, 20.02.2019, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2019-02-20/putins-welfare-address
32 Е. Мухаметшина, ‘Послание президента не помогло 
поднять рейтинги власти’, «Ведомости», 3.03.2019, 
https: //www.vedomosti.ru/politics /ar ticles /2019/ 
03/03/795536-ne 
33 https://fom.ru/Politika/10946
34 https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=9582
President Putin’s annual address, filled with 
social welfare commitments, demonstrat-
ed concern on the part of the authorities.
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nomic boom (apart from the economic crisis in 
2008–2009) enabled the standard of living to 
improve. This translated into a high level of sup-
port for the government, which was the basis 
of the Kremlin’s legitimacy, in turn allowing the 
state to be governed arbitrarily and enabling 
benefits to be reaped, abuses to be committed, 
and civil rights restricted. Under this system of 
government, a larger drop in the president’s 
ratings (even though they remain objectively 
high) is a warning and an indication of fading 
legitimacy. The previous fall, in 2010–2013, was 
accompanied by disquiet among the business 
and intellectual elite and socially active groups, 
a demonstration of weariness with Putin’s 
rule, and a wish to modernise the country. The 
Kremlin found a solution in the annexation of 
Crimea. This not only raised the president’s rat-
ings; it also brought the debate on the need 
for systemic changes to a complete close for 
a number of years. The Crimean “all or nothing” 
gamble produced a series of gains for the Krem-
lin. At the same time, it might have made the 
president ‘dizzy with success’, and his political 
empathy and ability to detect social tendencies 
- numbed. The president seems to be convinced 
that the annexation gave him carte blanche for 
activities at home35, including those as unpop-
ular as reducing social benefits. Accordingly, 
the Russian budget for the period up until 2020 
provided for reduction in social spending from 
5.5% of GDP (2017) to approximately 4.4%, 
cuts in the number of health service facilities, 
35 See also Т. Становая, ‘Что-то  не  так с  президентом. 
Как Россия проглотила Крым, а Крым – Владимира 
Путина’, Republic, 4.03.2019, https://republic.ru/posts 
/93197
and abolition of relief and subsidies, for exam-
ple for medicine36.
The post-Crimea period of consolidation is now 
coming to an end, which means that those in 
power are faced with the problem of further 
social strategy. The Kremlin will probably take 
measures to implement at least to some extent 
Putin’s social welfare commitments. This is pos-
sible due to the reserves accumulated as a result 
of the increase in the price of oil. Fully meeting 
the public’s demands, on the other hand, does 
not appear to be very realistic. This is due both 
to the ineffective state model and extensive bu-
reaucracy, which is incapable of implementing 
change effectively, and to the broad, system-
ic nature of the public’s social demands – for 
improvements with regard to operation of the 
health service, the state of the environment, 
and finally the government’s overall attitude 
towards the people. It also does not seem very 
likely that any geopolitical campaigns (such as 
further integration with Belarus) would produce 
the desired effects with respect to propaganda 
and compensate for the domestic problems, al-
though the government can play on the sense 
of a threat from the West and enflame fears of 
another global conflict37. The consequences of 
escalation of repression might also be in doubt. 
For many years, the authorities have employed 
acts of repression selectively towards active op-
ponents and have been developing legal instru-
ments to continue to persecute them. However, 
escalation of acts of repression and employing 
them on a large scale could harm the Kremlin’s 
image and cause further loss of support.
On the other hand, lengthy, large-scale protests 
and the creation of civil structures that would 
lead to a permanent change in the relationship 
between the authorities and the society are 
36 ‘Putin for the fourth time The state of and prospects 
for Russia (2018-2024)’, OSW Report, 20.03.2018, p. 32, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report / 
2018-03-20/putin-fourth-time 
37 Public more concerned about agression from other coun-
tries: https://www.levada.ru/2019/01/30/bolee-poloviny- 
rossiyan-sochli-realnoj-ugrozu-vojny-s-drugimi-stranami/ 
The post-Crimea period of consolidation is 
now coming to an end, which means that 
those in power face difficult decisions re-
garding further social strategy.
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equally unlikely. The likelihood that this would 
happen is reduced by the continued passivity 
and fragmentation among the public, which is 
a legacy of the USSR. Even though the protests 
are quite numerous and are attended in large 
numbers, they are brief and die out quickly, usu-
ally without the intended result being achieved. 
The broad downward trend with respect to 
support for the government, combined with 
the growing sense among the public of control 
over their own lives and of a need for change, 
could however present the Kremlin with a seri-
ous challenge. They are forcing the government 
to redefine its tactics in light of changing social 
attitudes and a developing crisis of legitimacy. 
The authorities will probably attempt to meet 
social welfare demands at least to some extent, 
while due to a number of factors (the scale 
of the needs, efficiency of public authorities, 
the cuts in social welfare made in the past) this 
could have limited effect. Other scenarios that 
in the past enabled the Kremlin to strengthen 
its position (geopolitical campaigns, domestic 
repression) could also have only a temporary 
effect. The president’s speeches and discus-
sions among state experts show in turn that 
the ruling camp does not have a new, com-
prehensive vision for development of Russia, 
and also often does not have the political will 
to agree to the demands and “dignity” aspira-
tions of a significant portion of Russian society.
APPENDIX
Source: https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/
Chart 1. Support for President Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev
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Chart 2. Trust in President Putin
Chart 3. Support for institutions – the president, the army, and the Orthodox Church
Source: https://wciom.ru/news/ratings/odobrenie_deyatelnosti_gosudarstvennyx_institutov/ and https://wciom.ru/news/rat-
ings/odobrenie_deyatelnosti_obshhestvennyx_institutov/  Data concerning the President of the Russian Federation 
was averaged, basing on data from surveys carried out in individual months.
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